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IN MEMORIAM
The Judiciary of Colorado and the legal profession suffered a tremendous loss with the death of Colorado Supreme Court Justice James K.
Groves. Justice Groves died April 6, 1980, after being hospitalized for a
stroke and resulting complications. He was appointed to Colorado's high
court by Governor John A. Love in April, 1968. Justice Groves was the first
appointee to the court under the merit system of selection. 1 As an Associate
Justice during his twelve years on the supreme court bench, he authored
more than 540 opinions-many of which are recognized as landmark decisions.
Justice Groves was born on August 29, 1910, in Grand Junction. He
attended Mesa College and received his undergraduate degree in 1932 from
the University of Colorado. He was graduated with honors from the University of Colorado law school in 1935.
Following law school, Justice Groves returned to Grand Junction where
he began building a reputation as one of the state's best trial attorneys. As a
private practitioner, he specialized in the areas of water and mineral law.
From 1940 to 1944, he served as a Mesa County Deputy District Attorney
and in 1948 became an Assistant District Attorney. In 1952, he became
Grand Junction's city attorney and remained in that capacity until 1956.
Justice Groves was one of the founders of the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation, a nationally recognized institution which publishes an annual legal journal utilized by many practitioners in the mineral law area.
He served as its president in 1935. Another significant legal accomplishment
was his membership, since 1958, in the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association. 2 In 1972, he was installed as chairman of this arm of the
ABA-the second highest position in the organization. He served in such
capacity until 1974. Justice Groves also served as president of the Colorado
Bar Association in 1949 and president of the Mesa County Bar Association
in 1938.
While in law school, Justice Groves was editor-in-chief of the Rocky
Mountain Law Review. He also served as co-editor of the American Law of
Mining and wrote several law review articles. Among the awards he received were the Colorado Bar Association's Award of Merit in 1959, the
Mesa College Distinguished Alumnus Award in 1969, and the University of
Colorado's William Lee Knous Award in 1969. In 1977, he was awarded a
doctor of law degree from the William Mitchell College of Law at St. Paul,
Minnesota. Justice Groves was also a fellow of the American College of
Trial Lawyers and the American Bar Foundation.
The remainder of this remembrance is dedicated to a discussion of some
1. Prior to selection ofJustices based upon the merit system, the Colorado Supreme Court
positions were filled in popular elections.
2. The House of Delegates is the American Bar Association's policy-making branch.
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of the many significant Colorado Supreme Court decisions Justice Groves
authored.
Signiftcant Water Law Decisions
Late in 1978, over 100 water applications involving claims for
thousands of wells and over twenty million acre feet of water in underground
reservoirs were filed in Colorado by various individuals, groups, and joint
venturers. The Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District and
others3 commenced an original proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court
requesting that the water cases be consolidated for a determination of com4
mon questions of law.
In Southeastern Colorado Water Conservang District v. Huston, 5 Justice
Groves granted relief for the petitioners. On the basis of the supervisory
powers granted to the court by the Colorado Constitution, 6 Justice Groves
ordered consolidation of the water cases and provided for the appointment
of a special water judge to make a determination of various threshold questions of law. 7 He ruled that the various petitioners had standing to seek
consolidation of the cases for determining these common legal issues.,
The threshold legal questions, resolution of which will represent a
landmark for Colorado water law, are (1) whether non-tributary waters in
Colorado are subject to appropriation; (2) if so, by what authority can such
water be appropriated; (3) can non-tributary waters outside the boundaries
of designated ground water basins be appropriated by persons having no
property interest in the surface; (4) can non-tributary waters outside the
boundries of designated ground water basins be appropriated for use by persons other than the claimant or those whom the claimant is authorized to
represent; and (5) can applications for non-tributary waters outside the
boundaries of designated ground water basins be filed (a) without first obtaining permits from the state engineer and, if so, (b) without first applying
for such permits. 9 Because these issues were not settled by constitutional
3. The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and the Southwestern Colorado
Water Conservation District were also petitioners.
4. The basis for the proceeding was the supreme court's supervisory powers granted by
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 2(1): "The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state, and shall
have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law."

5. 593 P.2d 1347 (Colo. 1979).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. 593 P.2d at 1349-51. Because the special water judge was temporarily assigned as an
additional water judge for each of the seven water divisions, original jurisdiction of the water
judges was not deprived and an improper change of venue did not occur. Id. at 1351-52.
8. Id. at 1352.
9. Id. at 1349. In a supplemental order, the court approved consideration of the following
additional issues by the waterjudge in his discretion: (1) can a decree be obtained for a right to
store tributary water in an underground reservoir created by the impoundment of water behind
a naturally-occurring glacial terminal moraine; (2) are non-tributary waters obtained from wells
in underground non-tributary aquifers subject to appropriation under the Colorado Constitution; (2)(a) if not, under what legal authority or status, and with what limitations, if any, does
any right to such water exist; (2)(b) under what procedure, if any, may or must such rights be
determined or confirmed; (3) when non-tributary, or de mrnrhnux tributary water infiltrates un-
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law, statutory provisions, or judicial decision, Justice Groves ruled that assignment of the issues to a special water judge for a consolidated ruling did
not deny the respondents due process or equal protection of the law. 0
There is no doubt that Justice Groves' expertise in the water area and
consideration of these issues would have had a significant impact upon the
ultimate outcome of the consolidated cases. He would have had the opportunity to author another decision of landmark importance in Colorado water
law. The decision will have tremendous legal and social significance affecting the rights of Colorado landowners and governing future developments. " I
In Fellhauer v.People, 12 a water division engineer shut off thirty-nine
wells in the Arkansas River alluvium without any written rules, regulations,
or prescribed guidelines. Since the Arkansas River Basin was over-appropriated, the action was taken in order to make more water available for satisfying adjudicated, senior surface rights. While the legislation (then in effect)
under which the engineer was acting was deemed a proper grant of authority,' 3 Justice Groves ruled that for such action to be constitutional under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and the due process clause in article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution, it must be performed pursuant to and "in compliance
with reasonable rules, regulations, standards and a plan established by the
state engineer prior to the issuance of the regulative orders."' 4 After the
decision, the state engineer began to promulgate rules and regulations for
5
administering tributary ground waters.'
derground structures and such infiltrating water would, if not intercepted, reach a natural
stream, may an applicant who does not allege ownership, or is not an owner of such structure,
obtain a decree for such water which is free from the call of the river; (4) are unconsumed
withdrawals, return flows or waste water from non-tributary sources which are not recaptured
by the developer, subject to claim under any right (appropriation or otherwise) independent of
claims on the stream or aquifer to which such waters ultimately discharge or return; (4)(a) if so,
what is the nature of such right; (5) can a decree be obtained for the right to store in a nonalluvial aquifer; (6) regarding issue (1)in the initial opinion, (a) may such waters be appropriated pursuant to the doctrine of prior appropriation, (b) may such waters be appropriated
under a theory of "developed water," and (c) can such waters be appropriated by persons having no property interests in the surface but having the knowledge or consent of the surface
owner or agreements between the claimant and the surface owner; and (7) is the owner in fee of
the surface land also the owner of the non-tributary ground water lying under the land by
virtue of his capacity as an owner or is such water to be claimed and decreed in accordance with
the doctrine of appropriation by such owner. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist.
v. Huston, No. 79 SA 38 (Colo., Aug. 29, 1979) (supplemental order considering additional
questions of law).
10. 593 P.2d at 1353-54.
11.A decision in the consolidated cases is expected to be rendered by the special water
judge, Judge Shivers, in 1980. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston, No.
79 CW I (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct., Colo., filed Apr. 16, 1979).
12. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
13. Id. at 330, 447 P.2d at 991.
14. Id. at 334, 447 P.2d at 993. Two additional requirements were noted:
(2) Reasonable lessening of material injury to senior rights must be accomplished by
the regulation of the wells.
(3) If by placing conditions upon the use of a well, or upon its owner, some or all of its
water can be placed to a beneficial use by the owner without material injury to senior
users.

id.
15.

Greer, A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 181, 186 (1970).
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Of significant importance is Justice Groves' amplification of the Colorado Constitution's 16 establishment of the prior appropriation doctrine for
acquiring rights in the waters of any natural stream:
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions that, along with
vested rights, there shall be maximum utlhzation of the water of this
state. As administration of water approaches its second century the
curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilizati'on and
how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
vested rights. We have known for a long time that the doctrine was
lurking in the backstage shadows as a result of the accepted,
though oft violated, principle that the right to water does not give
7
the right to waste it.1
The Colorado legislature reacted favorably to the introduction of the new
era of maximum utilization of water in the state. Comprehensive legislation,
the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969,18 was enacted to provide for the administration, distribution, and regulation of all
surface and underground water in or tributary to all natural streams in Colorado.' 9 While the doctrine of maximum utilization is subject to restrictions
against waste, it is unsettled whether the doctrine is readily applicable to
non-tributary ground water, when one considers the over-appropriated conditions of tributary surface and ground waters and the significant value of
scarce, easily accessible non-tributary ground water sources to the surface
20
owner.
Four additional issues were presented in Fellhauer but were not directly
ruled upon. 2 1 Justice Groves noted that "subsurface channel," while incapable of precise definition and determination, generally referred to the portion
of the alluvium beneath and adjacent to the surface channel. 22 Relative to
ground water administration, he noted that date of priority was not the sole
consideration for determining which wells were to be shut off first. Other
factors such as proximity, actual effect, futile calls, supply predictions, and
economic planning were noted. 23 However, a determinative resolution of
these issues and others pertaining to the right of senior users to support
24
surface flow by uplifting groundwater was reserved.
16. "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of approporation shall give the better right as between those
using the water for the same purpose.
...
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
17. 167 Colo. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (emphasis in original).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 (1973).
19. See Kuiper v.Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 126, 490 P.2d 268, 271
(1971).
20. The scope of maximum utilization of water in Colorado will be more defined after
resolution of the consolidated cases. See note 11 supra.
21. 167 Colo. at 337, 447 P.2d at 994.
22. Id. at 337-38, 447 P.2d at 995. Because the defendant's well was determined to be
within the "subsurface channel," a legislatively created rebuttable presumption regarding lack
of injury to vested rights could not operate in his favor. Id.
23. Id. at 341-42, 447 P.2d at 996-97 (quoting Morgan, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground
Water A Continuing Dtlema?, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 133, 138, 139-40 (1967)). The trial court
disposed of defendant's argument that later priority wells be shut off first by noting that defendant's rights were so junior to affected senior rights that no consideration need be given to priority dates. Id. at 340, 447 P.2d at 996.
24. Id. at 342-43, 447 P.2d at 997.
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Cit and County ofDenver v. Fulton Ir'gatingDitch Co.2 5 involved a declaratory judgment action commenced by Denver and the Adolph Coors Company to determine Denver's rights in water obtained through transmountain
diversions. The diversions involved a transfer of water from the Colorado
River Basin on the Western Slope to the South Platte River Basin on the
Eastern Slope. The defendant ditch companies diverted water from the
South Platte River downstream from the discharge point of a sewage plant
which processed Denver's sewage. A goal of minimum use of imported water
was recognized in a United States District Court decree which fixed the pri26
orities of Blue River water imported by Denver.
Denver wished to know whether it could make successive uses of the
transmountain water while its dominion over the water continued. 27 Defendants' principal argument was that Denver could not make a disposition
of the water after use. The defendants feared Denver would use primarily
imported water during the irrigating season with recaptured portions going
to its transferees and primarily South Platte River water in the non-irrigating season thereby depriving the defendants of imported water returned to
28
the river.
Writing for the court, Justice Groves held that Denver, in the absence of
agreement otherwise, could re-use, make a successive use of, and after use
make a disposition of imported transmountain water.29 The court felt this
would be the law even absent a statute 30 apparently giving Denver such
rights. 3 1 An analogy was drawn from the law of developed water. Developed water is that which has been added to the supply of a stream and
which never would have come into the stream but for the efforts of the person producing it. Developers of such water are entitled to use, re-use, make
successive use of, and dispose of the water. 32 No distinction was made between the rights of a developer in developed water and those of Denver in
imported water.33 In effect, a downstream appropriator has no right to rely
on the discharge of foreign water into a stream following its use, re-use, and
successive use by the importer. 34
Justice Groves also established the following definitions:
"Re-use" means a subsequent use of imported water for the
same purpose as the original use.
"Successive use" means subsequent use by the water importer
for a different purpose.
25. 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972).
26. Id. at 54-55, 506 P.2d at 148.
27. Another issue was whether Denver could exchange water under a 1969 agreement with
Coors. Because of an earlier agreement entered into by Denver, the court ruled that Denver
could not exchange water under the Coors agreement. Id. at 51, 59-64, 506 P.2d at 146, 150-53.
28. Id. at 55, 506 P.2d at 148-49.
29. Id. at 51, 506 P.2d at 146.
30. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-101 (1973).
31. 179 Colo. at 52, 506 P.2d at 147.
32. See Ripley v. Park Center Land & Water Co., 40 Colo. 129, 90 P. 75 (1907).
33. 179 Colo. at 53, 506 P.2d at 147.
34. Id. at 53-54, 506 P.2d at 147-48. See also Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124
Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
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"Right of disposition" means the right to sell, lease, exchange
or otherwise dispose of effluent containing foreign water after distribution through Denver's water system and collection in its sewer
5
system.3
Regarding defendants' primary argument noted above, Justice Groves
held that such a pattern of use by Denver would be unreasonable and would
unconstitutionally deprive defendants of their water rights in the South
Platte River.3 6 He ruled that Denver was not to depart substantially from
its past practice of returning water originating in the South Platte basin during the irrigation season. 37 Justice Groves also reversed the lower court's
determination that Denver lost dominion over water when it was delivered
to the customer's tap on the ground that Denver controls the amount of
38
water it treats and the amount passed on to other treatment facilities.
Moreover, the delivery of imported water to an agent of Denver for treatment did not constitute an abandonment of this water because the City did
39
not so intend to abandon.
In Kuiper v. Lundvall,4° the defendant had three wells each located in a
quarter section pumping from a designated ground water basin. His application for a well on a fourth quarter section was denied on the ground that
the area was over-appropriated. He then began to transport water from one
of the existing wells to irrigate the quarter section having no well. The state
engineer brought an action to enjoin the defendant from transporting this
water since under the Central Yuma County Ground Water Management
District's rules, designated ground water could not be used on land other
than that described in the permit. The defendant counterclaimed asking
that the Colorado Ground Water Management Act 41 be declared unconstitutional. The lower court, finding the water was tributary, held the Act to
be unconstitutional.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. At
the outset, Justice Groves held that water taking over a century to reach the
stream is of a e mtnimus tributary character and therefore not tributary to
the stream. 4 2 Without reaching the constitutionality issue, the court reversed the lower court's finding that the Colorado Ground Water Management Act as applied to tributary ground water was unconstitutional.
Justice Groves also reversed the lower court's finding that the Act was
unconstitutional because it delegated judicial functions to an administrative
agency. He ruled that the Colorado Constitution does not prevent the legislature from placing jurisdiction for water administration in an agency, even
35. 179 Colo. at 52, 506 P.2d at 146-47.
36. Id. at 56, 506 P.2d at 149.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 56-57, 506 P.2d at 149.
39. Id. at 58-59, 506 P.2d at 150.
40. 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d 1328 (1974), appealdiszwsed, 421 U.S. 996 (1975).
41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-1 to -38 (1965 Penn. Supp.) (currently CoLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-90-101 (1973)).
42. 187 Colo. at 44, 529 P.2d at 1331.
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43
though water adjudication has been traditionally in the courts.

Justice Groves again noted the concept of maximum utilization he introduced in Fellhauer.4 4 He recognized that the Colorado legislature, in the
Colorado Ground Water Management Act, had provided a means by which
the maximum utilization of designated, non-tributary ground water in Colorado can be obtained. 4 5 He also noted that the state engineer and ground
water commission were proceeding under this Act consistently with the doc46
trine of maximum utilization.
The above cases represent only a few of the significant water law decisions authored by Justice Groves. Altogether, he wrote more than fifty water
law opinions. He will be long remembered for his vast and important contributions to the development and growth of Colorado water law.
Other Signifant Dectst'ons
Justice Groves also wrote landmark opinions in areas other than water
law. In Lovato v. Dzstrict Court,4 7 the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to
resolve a difficult controversy about the proper legal definition of death.
The mother and guardians ad/item of an infant commenced an original proceeding seeking review of a district court's order directing the guardians to
execute a document authorizing the treating physician and hospital to remove all life support systems if, in the doctor's opinion, the child was legally
dead.
After ruling that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to order the removal of the life support system sustaining the infant, Justice Groves reviewed the petitioners' allegation that the juvenile court had exceeded its
jurisdiction and abused its discretion in recognizing the concept of brain
death. 48 He held that the absence of a legislative answer to the question
whether an irreversible cessation of brain functioning can be used to deter49
mine death did not preclude the court from resolving the issue.
Thus, relying on current scientific views and medical opinions, judicial
decisions, and legislation enacted in other states, the court established for
Colorado the proposed Uniform Brain Death Act which defines legal death
as an irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain. 50 This test was
adopted as an alternative to the traditional standard of death based upon
total stoppage of blood circulation and a cessation of vital functions such as
51
respiration and pulse.
43. Id. at 46, 529 P.2d at 1332 (quoting Larrick v. North Kiowa Bijou Management Dist.,
181 Colo. 395, 404, 510 P.2d 323, 328 (1973)).
44. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
45. 187 Colo. at 45, 529 P.2d at 1331.

46. Id.
47. 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979).
48. Id. at 1075.
49. Id. at 1081.
50. Id. " 'For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under
this section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards.' " Id.
51. Id. at 1076.
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In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. 52 the operators of an antique shop
brought a libel action against a newspaper for publication of material concerning the purchase for resale of allegedly stolen goods. The Colorado
Supreme Court was asked to fashion a standard of liability applicable to a
publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual but involving a matter of general public interest.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,53 the United States Supreme Court expressly gave the states authority to create appropriate standards for such
situations. Accordingly, Justice Groves, speaking for a majority of the Colorado court, adopted the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.54 He held that the publisher of a defamatory statement concerning one who is not a public official or public figure but involving a matter of public concern will be liable to the person defamed only if the
publisher knew the statement was false or if the statement was made with a
55
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
Justice Groves qualified the adoption of the Rosenbloom rule, however,
with the limitation that a finding of reckless disregard need not be based
upon a finding that the publisher actually had serious doubts about the
truth of the statement published. 56 Justice Groves noted that his holding
was based on the court's conclusions that a simple negligence rule would
result in such a chilling effect on the media that only insufficient facts would
be printed in order to protect itself against libel actions and this insufficiency
would be more harmful to the public interest than an absence of adequate
57
compensation to a defamed private individual.
Hitgel v.General Motors Corp.5 was a products liability suit presenting
the issue whether a manufacturer's failure to warn of dangers inherent in the
use or misuse of a product can render defective a product that is otherwise
free of defect. The case involved an action by the purchaser of a motor
home against the manufacturer and retailer for damages resulting when the
rear wheels separated from the vehicle during operation. The supreme
court, through Justice Groves, expressly adopted for Colorado the doctrine
of strict liability in tort as articulated in section 402A of the second Restatement of Torts.5 9 He then pronounced the existence of a duty to warn of
potential hazards and held that a failure to comply with this duty may make
a product defective when the proximate cause of an injury is a breach of this
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
188 Colo. at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457.
Id. at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
Id. at 99, 538 P.2d at 458.
190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).

59. Id. at 63, 544 P.2d at 987. This portion of the Restatement is as follows:
(1) One who sells any product

in

a defective condition unreasonably dangerous

to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which itis sold.
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duty. 6 0
The court disagreed with the lower court's ruling that the plaintiff was
precluded from recovery by reason of his general experience and knowledge
as to wheel maintenance. Justice Groves held that the general knowledge of
wheel maintenance and of the fact that stud nuts must be kept tight was not
the legal equivalent of knowledge of the manufacturer's torque requirements. Only relevant knowledge and understanding of the plaintiff, for example, if the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter
a known risk, could amount to a defense under section 402A's'strict liability
61
theory.
Justice Groves further ruled that the duty to warn is not satisfied by
instructions about use of the product which say nothing about inherent dangers likely to arise if the instructions are not followed. 62 Additionally, the
court extended the doctrine of strict liability to cover damage done to the
defective product as well as harm caused the ultimate user or consumer and
his property. However, the court declined to extend this doctrine to cover
commercial or business loss. 6 3 And, finally, Justice Groves announced that
where a component part is incorporated without change into some larger
product, the remote manufacturer will be strictly liable to the ultimate user
64
or consumer for damage resulting from defects in the part.
CONCLUSION

Despite his wide travels and significant legal accomplishments, Justice
Groves remained in his heart a Western Slope citizen. He was very devoted
to his wife, Verna, and his three children. His high dedication to the legal
profession is reflected in an outstanding scholastic record as a law student,
his success and national reputation as a private practitioner, and his regard
as a hard working, outstanding, and distinguished jurist on the Colorado
Supreme Court. This dedication to the law and a desire for improving judicial processes resulted in his significant contribution to the body of Colorado
law. This contribution, in turn, is one of the reasons Colorado's judicial system enjoys a fine national reputation. The memories of Justice James K.
65
Groves as an outstanding person, lawyer, and jurist will long remain.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979).

60. 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988.
61. Id. at 64, 544 P.2d at 988.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 64-65, 544 P.2d at 989.
64. Id. at 65, 544 P.2d at 989.
65. The DENVER LAW JOURNAL wishes to recognize Randall J. Feuerstein, Diane L. Burkhardt, and Stephen M. Brown for their efforts in the preparation of this article.

